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Recommendations
\ Provide support for Afghanistan’s 
future generations
An estimated 46 per cent of the Afghan population 
is under 15 years of age. Given the deteriorated 
security situation in many parts of the country since 
2009, religious education is often the only option 
to learn. With the increasing influence of Salafi 
madrassas and mosques, a growing share of youth 
gets exposed to potentially radical thoughts through 
basic education. Thus, it is of utmost importance to 
expand and improve technical and financial support 
for non-partisan basic education, vocational training 
and high-quality secondary and higher education for 
Afghanistan’s youth.
\ Capture lessons learned to prevent 
the spread of violent extremism and 
(co-)radicalization
Critically review German foreign and development 
policy regarding its potential impact on radicalization 
and countering violent extremism since the start of 
German engagement in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
Future policies in Afghanistan as well as in other 
intervention contexts should take the lessons 
of this reflection into account. It can benefit the 
design of intervention strategies not only of the 
German government but also other members of the 
international community. 
\ Urge the government of the Islamic  
Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) to  
formulate an effective policy on religious 
institutions and curricula
Any new initiative at Islamic education sector reform 
must be preceded by a critical analysis of why previous 
reform attempts did not succeed, and religious scholars 
did not engage. The GoIRA should change budgeting 
priorities and consider allocating more resources to the 
construction and financing of community mosques and 
religious schools (madrassas) so that the field is not 
left to Wahhabi- and Salafi-inspired donors. External 
influences and funding for religious institutions 
regardless of sect should be cut off.   
\ Support debates about the role of  
religion and ideology in Afghan society 
The notion of Islam has increasingly become contested 
in Afghanistan due to the fragmentation of the political 
and religious landscape over the last decades. Jihadi 
interpretations of Islam have become widespread; 
Salafism and particularly militant Jihadi-Salafism is just 
one among several such ideologies. Additional funding 
lines should enable religious and non-religious civil 
society groups to launch grassroots and policy initiatives 
that could engage Afghans of all walks of life in broad-
based debates about the role of religion and ideology in 
Afghan society.
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Daesh and the expansion of Jihadi- 
Salafism in Afghanistan 
Since July 2017, the declared liberation of Mosul, Iraq, 
and the expected fall of Raqqa, Syria, has brought the 
debate about the survival of so-called Islamic State 
(Daesh) to the forefront. The loss of control over terri-
tory and people in Iraq and Syria raises the question 
whether Daesh will dissolve completely or whether it 
will survive the fall of Mosul and Raqqa. This Policy 
Brief argues that even if Daesh loses control of Raqqa 
and Mosul, Jihadi-Salafism will survive as a viable 
ideology in the Iraqi-Syrian region, but also continue 
to affect Afghanistan as well as Europe. The ideas that  
the Daesh group has cultivated among Sunni Muslim 
sympathizers and followers bear the potential for  
further radicalization and the spread of violent  
extremism for a generation to come. Current radicali-
zation processes are likely to result in more violence, 
large-scale displacement and regional—cross-border— 
instability in Central and South Asia and increase the 
risks of terrorist attacks in Europe. Based on an in-
depth analysis of Daesh in Afghanistan1, its strategy 
and its current transformation, from a social move-
ment perspective, we argue that Daesh’s long-lasting 
impact is primarily ideological. More than adhering 
to a specific organizational model, Daesh is centrally 
about narrative and positioning itself as the “ideolog-
ical hegemon of global jihadism” (Winter, 2017). The 
background and policy recommendations of this Brief 
advise German foreign and development policy how 
to counter the risk emanating from Jihadi-Salafism 
in Afghanistan. 
Different Daeshs in various areas 
of Afghanistan
Research in Afghanistan showed that Daesh mani-
fests itself in different organizational forms across 
the various regions of the country, depending on the 
particular local political dynamics and historical 
 
1 \  BICC and its Afghan research partner organization The Liaison Office 
(TLO) conducted a joint research project on the phenomenon of Daesh 
in Afghanistan between March and December 2016; funded by the  
German Federal Foreign Office. The results and details on the method-
ology are published in Mielke, K., & N. Miszak (2017)
path dependencies.Fighting both the Afghan govern-
ment and the Taliban, Daesh was able to set up state-
like institutions such as courts, prisons and a basic 
bureaucratic administration only in eastern Afghan- 
istan. In other areas, such as north-eastern Afghani-
stan’s Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces, 
armed and militant Salafis fighting under the um-
brella of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate declared  
allegiance to Daesh but were disarmed by the Taliban. 
In western and northern Afghanistan, Daesh exploited 
local conflicts and rifts within the Taliban and thus 
became a resource in local power struggles. In other 
areas, Daesh’s potential, not actual presence was used 
by local officials to seek security- related resources 
from the central government or to distract from their 
own failures at governing. 
This regionally differentiated manifestation of Daesh 
reflects the transformation of a hierarchical and  
homogenising state-like structure into a more acen-
tric political formation. It appears that relations  
between Daesh supporters in Afghanistan and Iraq 
and Syria were never particularly direct and hierar-
chical even when the Islamic State controlled large 
swaths of territory. The emergence and presence of 
Daesh in Afghanistan and the combination of Salaf-
ism with violent, militarized Jihadism is not just an 
extension of the Islamic State’s political project in 
Syria and Iraq. Local groups in Afghanistan found  
inspiration in Daesh without being closely integrated 
or coordinated by a central leadership structure. Even 
within Afghanistan, i.e. between Daesh’s leadership 
council in Nangarhar province and groups operating 
in other areas of Afghanistan, order and response 
structures are weak and ad hoc. This reflects the highly 
fragmented Afghan political landscape which histori-
cally has not experienced a degree of state penetration 
comparable to Iraq and Syria. 
Jihadi-Salafism, radicalization and the 
larger transformation of the religious 
landscape
The combination of violent jihad and Salafism is cen-
tral to Daesh’s strategy. This so-called Jihadi-Salafism 
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will continue to shape Afghan society beyond the fall 
of Islamic State strongholds Raqqa and Mosul. Since 
the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s, the religious and  
social landscape in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region, 
particularly affecting the Sunni community, has been 
in an ongoing process of transformation. This milita-
rized and radicalizing environment has supported  
numerous violent jihadist groups2 and provided a  
fertile ground for the emergence and partial consoli-
dation of Daesh and the popularity of its ideology 
since its appearance in mid-2014.
Salafism is a relatively recent phenomenon in Afghan-
istan and has thrived since the toppling of the Taliban 
regime in late 2001 after the US-led intervention.3 The 
removal of the religiously conservative and certainly 
brutal Taliban regime and the simultaneous neglect 
of religion—a central component of social life in  
Afghanistan—by the international community’s 
peacebuilding efforts unwillingly opened space for 
public and private religious entrepreneurs to spread 
Islam of a Salafist inclination without sharing 
Daesh’s political objectives. The growing influence of 
Salafism goes hand in hand with the construction of 
a religious infrastructure by Gulf Arab countries. These 
countries have taken the lead in building mosques 
and madrassas in rural areas as well as in urban centres, 
appointing Salafist Imams, and thereby shaping the 
religious curriculum. Given the demographic struc-
ture of the Afghan population—more than 46 per cent 
are below 15 years of age—, increasing numbers of the 
population and especially youth are exposed to Salafi 
education. Religious basic education often remains 
the only option for learning in the context of deterio-
rating security conditions. 
It cannot be emphasized enough that most Salafists 
do not support violence and disagree with Daesh’s  
political strategy and objectives. However, Daesh’s 
(limited) success in gaining a foothold in the Afghan-
istan–Pakistan borderland stems from the combina 
2 \  The use of the word jihadism, or jihadist, is controversial since jihad 
has a variety of violent and non-violent meanings. In this Policy Brief, 
jihadist is used in relation to violence and armed struggle.
3 \  Only in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan did Salafism have local 
roots, which go back to the 1980s and even 1960s.
tion of Salafism with the practice of violent jihad. As 
part of the ongoing transformation of the religious 
and social landscape in the Afghanistan–Pakistan 
region, particularly affecting the Sunni community, 
Jihadi- Salafism is becoming increasingly influential 
at the expense of other schools of Islamic thinking.4 
On the one hand, the members of groups that are not 
necessarily Salafist but share many of Daesh’s political 
goals and religious tenets—including the legitimacy 
of offensive jihad and violence against other Muslims 
—have been absorbed by Daesh, such as the Pakistani 
Taliban (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam. On the other 
hand, the traditionally quietist Salafis are becoming 
politicized and increasingly mobilize for offensive  
jihad or support thereof. 
We should also note that the transformation of the  
religious landscape in Afghanistan and its border  
region with Pakistan is not exceptional. It is linked 
with similar processes elsewhere, including in  
Europe. After all, Daesh’s success consists not only in 
gaining a foothold in Afghanistan but also in attract-
ing a large number of foreign fighters, many of them 
from Europe, not least through its effective propaganda 
and the emotive attraction of its narratives. 
The lack of a counter-narrative to 
Daesh
By portraying itself as the force that is establishing 
the caliphate anticipated in the primary religious 
sources of Islam and that is redrawing the national 
boundaries set by the colonial powers in the Middle 
East in 1916, Daesh provides a master frame that  
introduces a new narrative to a global and Afghan  
audience. This frame and the wave of success  
between 2014 and 2016 proved effective in inspiring 
local groups in Afghanistan as well as in attracting  
4 \  In contrast to the majority of the Afghan population and also the Taliban 
who are considered Deobandi-inspired Hanafis, Salafists reject the 
Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence and recognize only hadith and 
Qur’an as guiding sources of belief. Accordingly, they adhere to a  
purist version of Islam opposing innovation and – in their quietist  
representation – overcome this by non-violent missionary activity. The 
politicization of Islam and the notion of jihad have brought about the 
notion of offensive jihad which is shared by a large number of jihadi 
groups in the Muslim world and Afghanistan-Pakistan
 JIHADI-SALAFISM IN AFGHANISTAN—BEYOND TALIBAN, AL-QAEDA AND DAESH \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK
4 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 6 \ 2017
return of refugees from neighbouring countries, the 
need for religious infrastructure and guidance at the 
community level explains why alternative funders of 
mosques and madrassas were not subjected to serious 
scrutiny. The void was filled by Gulf-Arab-funded 
NGOs, charities and private donors that not only 
constructed mosques and madrassas but also brought 
books and hired mullahs and teachers of a Salafist  
orientation. Second, the GoIRA did not succeed in  
reforming Islamic education. This has had the effect 
that, for example, the national Imam training centre 
in Kabul is funded by the United Arab Emirates. As 
concerns other Islamic education institutions such 
as the Islamic University currently being constructed 
by Saudi Arabia outside of Jalalabad (Nangarhar), it is 
not clear who will be in control of the curriculum, 
teachers’ appointments and financial flows. Not only 
Daesh in Nangarhar but also non-Salafi religious edu-
cation institutions use textbooks published (in 2003, 
2011, 2010) by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endow-
ment, Mission (da’wa) and Guidance of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia. Although anecdotal, these examples 
illustrate how the funding, building and equipment 
of religious education institutes are largely being out-
sourced to external agents without any recognizable 
regulation by the government. 
Resource mobilization relies on trans-
local and domestic madrassa networks 
Instead of state control over religious institutions 
and their curriculum, a complex cross-regional and 
cross- border landscape of religious schools plays a 
significant role in providing religious education as 
well as propagating violent jihad in Afghanistan. 
Such structures are central for Daesh’s resource  
mobilization, i.e. recruiting and financing, and link 
people on both sides of the Afghan and Pakistani border 
areas. Reflecting the absence of a centralized religious 
clergy and hierarchy among Sunni Muslims and a 
unified, coherent institutional structure, madrassas 
propagating extremist violence can operate unchecked. 
large numbers of foreign, many of them European, 
fighters. Daesh has also proven capable of winning 
over part of the religious scholars and clerics (ulama), 
or of assuring that they remain silent and refrain from 
countering Daesh’s propaganda. Many pro-government 
or impartial religious scholars and clerics feel unpro-
tected and neglected by the Afghan government, live 
in fear for their lives and consequently remain silent 
or voice their support. The insecurity independent 
and government-related ulama face has largely eroded 
trust in the government and the national ulama council 
in Kabul. The latter is perceived as silent and inactive 
towards Daesh’s propaganda; theological debates are 
not sought, and the council is inept at supporting the 
everyday struggle of those ulama who can neither 
fight Daesh nor start a debate with them.
Daesh’s success and the larger transformation of the 
religious landscape in Afghanistan and Pakistan is 
due to the failure of the government, other jihadi 
groups, the Taliban or traditional and pro-government 
religious clerics to convincingly present alternatives. 
The Afghan government, in particular, has not suc-
ceeded in formulating an effective policy on and  
control of religious institutions, which includes the  
construction of religious infrastructure and the  
formulation of a modern curriculum. Similarly, the 
government of Pakistan has for long tolerated the 
mushrooming of radical religious seminaries in  
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
which provide the manpower for Daesh and other  
violent extremists. In hindsight, it seems crucial to  
review the formative years of the 2000s to understand 
how and why Salafi thought could spread quietly and 
prominently. 
Two processes can explain the spread of Salafism: 
First, Western development aid organizations have 
meticulously avoided funding Islamic community 
institutions since 2002. Given the significance of Islam 
in everyday life of ordinary Afghans and the high  
demand for mosques and madrassas after the mass  
5 \ 
International sponsors finance Afghan 
charity organizations, madrassas and 
mosques
While relations between Daesh in Afghanistan and 
the IS-headquarters in Raqqa do not appear to be 
strongly institutionalized, private donors from Gulf 
Arab countries play a more prominent role in sup-
porting Daesh in Afghanistan—in particular with  
regard to funding and the popularization of Jihadi- 
Salafist and Wahhabi ideological doctrines. These 
types of funding have a long tradition since resources 
had been mobilized en masse for jihad in the 1980s. 
Local resource-generation relies mainly on imposing 
taxes on valuables according to Islamic law. However, 
evidence from the research locations shows a mixed 
picture of taxation practices that correspond to the 
different degrees of Daesh’s presence and actual con-
solidation of its rule. The role of Afghan and Pakistani 
businessmen in fundraising is not to be underestimated 
as is the nexus of Salafi religious authority and busi-
ness. Cursory evidence from looking at some of the 
main organizers of trans-local Salafi networks sug-
gests a strong correlation of business and religious 
networks. Funds destined for Daesh in Afghanistan 
that are not raised locally are said to be transferred 
mainly in two ways: Through money and value transfer 
services such as the hawala system or from person to 
person (cash couriers). From Pakistan, a few such  
hawala-operators send money to Afghanistan. Many 
donors and non-state charities are connected to indi-
viduals situated primarily in Gulf Arab countries and 
Pakistan. At the same time, these same states are at the 
forefront of countermeasures against the financing of 
terrorism. This complicates international relations 
with countries and individuals pursuing entirely dif-
ferent policies, for example in the case of Saudi Arabia. 
Jihadi-Salafism constitutes the dominating force of 
influence driving the emergence and expansion of 
Daesh in Afghanistan but extremist violence is also 
propagated by groups that, while sharing many of 
Daesh’s criticisms and expressed grievances, are not 
Salafist (e.g., Panjpiri who are Deobandi). Further-
more, while Salafists agree on common foundations 
of belief, they differ in the extent of their political  
engagement and are not necessarily connected to 
each other. Of the multiple Salafi networks that exist, 
few sojourn at the surface and become visible to some 
degree because they have formal political wings or 
are run by famous religious scholars. Others operate 
silently but are likely no less effective in their teach-
ings and propaganda.Importantly, adherence to a 
Salafist creed partly overlaps with tribal, marriage 
and business links. These overlapping networks con-
nect Salafi religious scholars of different ranks, their 
madrassa- and mosque-networks and various forms of 
charity organizations. These organizations comple-
ment the network by forming the link between well-
known local clergy and their respective mosque- and 
madrassa networks with foreign donors, such as private 
persons, businessmen, bankers/ money changers, in-
ternational Islamic charities/ foundations/ NGOs, pri-
marily from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Gulf Arab 
countries (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, etc.). 
German development aid and other international  
donors should consider revising the established 
funding practice in rural and urban development 
programmes that exclude support for the building of 
community mosques and madrassas. This practice has 
caused communities to seek traditional ways of fund-
ing for mosques and local madrassas, either through a 
long-term process of collecting money themselves 
and/ or increasing reliance on Islamic charities and 
non-governmental organizations from Gulf Arab 
countries and Pakistan to fill the void. These funding 
organizations, often with Wahhabi–Salafist orientation, 
would usually appoint the local cleric in charge who 
would teach respective content.
 JIHADI-SALAFISM IN AFGHANISTAN—BEYOND TALIBAN, AL-QAEDA AND DAESH \ K. MIELKE & N. MISZAK
6 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 6 \ 2017
FURTHER READING
Afghanistan Analyst Network. (2017). Thematic Dossier XV: Daesh in  
Afghanistan. 1 August. Retrieved from https://www.afghanistan-ana-
lysts.org/publication/aan-thematic-dossier/thematic-dossi-
er-xv-daesh-in-afghanistan/
Baczko, A. Dorronsoro, G., Quesnay, A., & Youssef, M. (2016). The Rationality of 
an Eschatological Movement: The Islamist State in Iraq and Syria. (7th 
Working Paper). New Haven, CT: Program on Governance and Local 
Development, Yale University.
Mielke, K., & Miszak, N. (2017). Making Sense of Daesh in Afghanistan: A Social 
Movement Perspective. (Working Paper Series, 6/17). Bonn: BICC.
Neumann, P. (2016). Radicalized: New Jihadists and the Threat to the West. 
I.B.Tauris.
Revkin, M. (2016). The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State. (23rd Analysis 
Paper). Washington DC: Brookings Institute.
UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. (2015). Sixth Report 
of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. S/2015/648. New 
York: United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/
en/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports
UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. (2016). Seventh Re-
port of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. S/2016/842. 
New York, United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports
UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. (2017). Eighth Report 
of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. S/2017/409. New 
York: United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/
en/sanctions/1988/monitoring-team/reports
Winter, C. (2017). How ISIS Survives the Fall of Mosul. The Atlantic, 3 July. 
Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/ar-
chive/2017/07/mosul-isis-propaganda/532533/
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under:  
cf. creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
bicc \  
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn 
Bonn International Center for Conversion GmbH
Pfarrer-Byns-Straße 1, 53121 Bonn, Germany 
+49 (0)228 911 96-0, Fax -22, bicc@bicc.de 
www.bicc.de 
www.facebook.com/bicc.de 
Director for Research  
Professor Dr Conrad Schetter 
Director for Administration 
Michael Dedek
This Policy Brief is an outcome of research within the cooperative project ‘Study on the so-called Islamic State in Afghanistan’. 
The research has been undertaken by The Liaison Office (TLO) in Kabul, Afghanistan, and BICC in Bonn, Germany.  The project 
has been funded by the German Federal Foreign Office.
AUTHORS 
Dr Katja Mielke: Senior Researcher at BICC





EDITORIAL DESIGN   
Diesseits – Kommunikationsdesign, Düsseldorf
ISSN (Print) 2522-2031
ISSN (Online) 2521-7801
supported by
